Posts Tagged ‘federal procurements’

The Portland (Maine) Press-Herald’s November 6 article about the probable loss of NASA research grants that support the work of four students is heart-breaking.  If this seems excessive, consider what that tells us about the dismal unraveling of USM under its troubled leadership of the past few years.

As one who spent much of her professional life in senior management at NASA, I know that research grants and contracts awarded by federal agencies are not, in fact, awarded to the student or faculty investigators.  They are awarded to the institution.  This is so because federal research administrators know that institutional commitment to a project is essential to its success.

To ensure that commitment, federal research grants and contract awards include a sizable percentage (in the case of USM, 42.8%) of additional funding per grant dollar to finance facilities and administrative costs—or research ‘overhead.’  Preserving credibility with sponsors of student and faculty research is important to the university’s future.  Ill-considered cuts that undermine sponsored research to which the university has committed diminish that credibility.

The sorry saga of USM’s struggles to cope with serious budget shortfalls has displayed an approach toward institutional management that seems exclusively preoccupied with numbers.  Business management in the United States—which now dominates the management of USM—has for years been bewitched by the notion:  “If you can’t measure it, you can’t manage it.”

Thus have we all become instruments—whether consumers, managers, students, teachers, or citizens—of various accounting exercises.  Sophisticated computer software renders those exercises increasingly remote, and the original values being measured ever more mysterious, while the output of ultra high speed computations become the only reality that seems to matter.

But, oddly, when asked to consider the things that really do matter to us, rarely do we respond with things that can be counted.  We treasure the first cry of a healthy newborn, the laughter of children, the smiles of our loved ones, a Bach cantata, the sweet faces of Botticelli’s painting of Springtime, seeing the heavens through the eyes of the Hubble Space Telescope, the beautifully explicated political wisdom of the Federalist papers, and those sacred religious texts that comfort us when in darkness.  These are the kinds of qualitative values that we live for, and that cannot be captured by the accountant’s calculus.

To the extent that we have created institutions to preserve such things, and to ensure their survival through scientific study and investigation, through the mastery of music and literature, through philosophical scrutiny, as well as through advancing technology and engineering, we have created universities.

A university’s overriding ‘business’ is the award of academic degrees for completed programs of enduringly worthwhile study.  As any academic institution’s degrees lose essential content and thereby lose qualitative value, follow-on graduate programs at other institutions will discount them, prospective employers will discount them, students will stop coming, alumni stop giving, donors fear to waste their limited funds, the public stops caring, and a death spiral looms.

And now here we are, the calculus driving the unraveling of USM is the calculus of the marketplace.  One reads in vain of indications that the probity of its academic degrees is the USM administration’s overriding concern.  If it were, the dreary recital of budget cuts would list every possible expense that does not directly serve the content of the degrees it hopes to award—e.g. physical plant, administrative overhead, consultants’ fees, athletic programs—before we would read of eviscerating faculty and academic program content.

Dire budget crises are endemic to public sector organizations.  They go with the territory.  They challenge leadership of such organizations to regain a laser-like focus on what their essential purposes are, and to dispense with things that do not directly serve those essential purposes.  That kind of leadership is creative and imaginative, and finds ways to make the numbers conform to the institution, rather than the institution conform to the numbers.

Vaporous and costly exercises in university rebranding, revisioning, and reinvention only contribute to the centrifugal forces threatening USM’s essential purpose.  USM must decide–publicly, and as an institution rather than an accumulation of fiefdoms–what constitutes essential study for each of its majors and each of the degrees it awards.  Then it can insist on the latitude to redeploy faculty—most of which are competent in different areas within their disciplines—as fluctuating enrollments require. This is tough work, much tougher than announcing academic staff and program cuts, which is the easy way out.   It is also the wrong way out.

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The New Enclosure (Part II)

The notion that the things we create belong to us is not new; it dates back at least to 560, when Ireland’s King Diarrmait ruled against the monk Colmcille, who had secretly copied his mentor Finnian’s psalter.  (Legend records Diarmait’s judgment as “To every cow belongs her calf, therefore to every book belongs its copy.”)

But that is not how President Andrew Jackson’s appointee to the U.S. Supreme Court Justice John McLean applied the principle in his majority opinion in Wheaton v. Peters (1834).  Scholars can debate whether ownership of one’s own original works is in fact a natural or common law right, as King Diarmait supposed, or whether it is a privilege granted by the sovereign.[i] But Justice McLean could find in the United States no common law right to the exclusive use of one’s creations.

At issue was whether Henry Wheaton enjoyed a common law copyright in the annotated  reports, with opinions, of the Supreme Court that he had prepared and published, a copyright that Richard Peters had violated when he published cheaper, abridged editions of  Wheaton’s reports.

Two lower courts had held, as McLean would affirm, that:

“It is clear there can be no common law of the United States. The federal    government is composed of twenty-four sovereign and independent states, each of which may have its local usages, customs, and common law. There is no principle which pervades the union and has the authority of law that is not embodied in the Constitution or laws of the union.”[ii]

Only the Congress, by virtue of section eight of the first article of the Constitution, has the power “to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times, to authors and inventors, the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”  “Congress,” wrote McLean, “by the act of 1790, instead of sanctioning an existing perpetual right in an author in his works, created the right, secured for a limited time, by the provisions of that law.”[iii]

And then, at the end of his majority opinion, McLean added:

“It may be proper to remark that the Court is unanimously of opinion that no reporter has or can have any copyright in the written opinions delivered by this Court, and that the judges thereof cannot confer on any reporter any such right.”

Thus it was that the U.S. Supreme Court established, almost as an afterthought, that the information generated by those in whom the “People of the United States” have vested their  legislative, executive, and judicial powers, belongs to the people of the United States, and that any proprietary right in that information can be granted only by the Congress, as provided in Article I, Section 8.

In the modern world intellectual capital is the purest coin of any realm.  No less than the metallic coin of economics, its greatest social benefits accrue from widespread accumulation and circulation.  Before World War II the largest accumulation of intellectual capital owned by the federal government took the form of census data, information gathered by regulatory agencies, and scientific and technical information collected by the departments of Agriculture, Interior, the US navy, army, and coast guard.  Of comparable value for the continuation of democracy was the growing body of  interrelated reports prepared by the legislative, judicial, and executive branches of government and their administrative agencies.

World War II and the Cold War resulted in the unprecedented expansion of publicly directed and funded research. Federal investments in research and development (R&D) increased at over twice the rate of the total federal budget between 1940 and 1980.  This research produced new ideas and knowledge—information necessary for effective understanding and action—of inestimable value.

Most of those federal dollars—which grew from $186 million in 1940 to over $72 billion in 2000—flowed as contracts and grants  through the procurement offices of the departments of defense and energy, the National Institutes of Health, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.   Those dollars then began to substantially support the budgets of an expanding aerospace and healthcare industry, as well as research universities. The accumulated skills of these private sector institutions at obtaining federal grants and contracts, and their lobbying to sustain the federal research and development programs that produced them, ensured that they would receive the lion’s share of the public’s R&D investment for decades to come.

At the start of the 21st century three fourths or more of the R&D budgets at each of the principal federal research and development agencies[iv] went to a relatively small group of corporations that included such familiar heavy-hitters as Lockheed-Martin, Boeing (which absorbed McDonnell Douglas in 1997), Raytheon, Bechtel, TRW, and Science Applications International.  Beneficiaries among academic institutions included the universities of California, Michigan and Washington, Columbia, Stanford, and the Johns Hopkins University.

Before the 1980s, once a sponsoring agency obtained information from a recipient of one of its research grants or contracts,  members of the public could, in turn, request that information under the federal Freedom of Information Act or FOIA (subject to the usual privacy or national security exemptions).  Most agencies, however, settled for research reports, accepting their contractors’ or grantees’ claims that data must be withheld from the public in order to protect the identity of human research subjects, sequester data prior to its publication in peer-reviewed research journals, or to protect the data’s potential proprietary value.

Waiving delivery of research data as a matter of policy received the imprimatur of the U.S. Supreme Court in 1980, when it ruled (in Forsham v. Harris) that if a federal agency did not actually create or obtain research data itself, such data could not be considered federal records and subject to the FOIA.  Forsham was a boon to academic research institutions that had wandered from their ideological moorings of disinterested science into the sporty waters of high-technology business, a process well-captured in Daniel S. Greenberg’s Science for Sale: The Perils, Rewards, and Delusions of Campus Capitalism (2007).

Then, critics of the national air quality standards released by the Environmental Protection Agency in 1997 during the Clinton administration, led by Senator Richard Shelby (R-AL), complained that not only would the standards burden industry with ruinously high compliance costs, but several studies of toxic effects of air and water pollutants had later proven faulty.  Thus, given their serious policy consequences, data collected by the EPA for setting its standards should be available for public inspection.  Shelby attached to the Omnibus Appropriations Act for fiscal year (FY) 1999 an amendment requiring federal agencies to disclose “all data produced under a [federally funded research] award.”  The scientific community arose in alarm.[v]

Led by the National Academy of Sciences, the scientific establishment persuaded the White House’s Office of Management and Budget (OMB, which oversees the writing of regulatory language implementing federal statutes) to define research data subject to public disclosure in a way that would serve its expanding proprietary interests.  The OMB ultimately excluded from research data subject to FOIA disclosure any data supporting regulations having an impact of less than $100 million, and “materials necessary to be held confidential by a researcher until they are published, or similar information which is protected under law” (e.g., intellectual property.)  The Shelby amendment, once it emerged from OMB’s process, had a lethal weakness: What constituted research “data” under OMB’s ‘clarifying’ definitions could be determined only by those who held it, viz., the same research scientists wanting to retain the data for their own uses.[vi]

Just how important public access to the results of its own investment in intellectual capital had become was evident with the completion in 2000 of the joint U.S. and British Human Genome Project.  Prime Minister Tony Blair’s and President Bill Clinton’s joint statement that “the genome should be made freely available to scientists everywhere” sent bio-technology stocks plummeting.  Investors had concluded that the federal government would oppose patenting human genomic data.  In a hasty effort at damage control, the White House urged the securities markets to read the leaders’ joint statement more carefully, where they would find: “Intellectual property protection for gene-based inventions will also play an important role in stimulating the development of important new health care products.”[vii] (To continue reading about the proprietary capture of public intellectual capital, see The New Enclosure-Part III).

 


[i] Adam Mossoff, “Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents?  Reevaluating the Patent ‘Privilege’ in Historical Context,”  Cornell Law Review, Vol. 92, No. 953 (2007).

[ii] U.S. Supreme Court, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).

[iii] U.S. Supreme Court, Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).

[iv] Departments of Defense and Energy, the National Science Foundation, National Institutes of Health, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration.

[v] National Research Council, Bits of Power: Issues in Global Access to Scientific Data (Washington, DC: National Research Council, 1997).

[vi] Sylvia Kraemer, Science and Technology Policy in the United States: Open Systems in Action (Rutgers Univesity Press, 2006, pp. 102-108.

[vii] White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, “Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Tony Blair of the U.K.,” March 14, 2000.  Alex Berenson and Nicholas Wade, “The Markets: Stocks & Bonds; A Call for Sharing of Research Causes Gene Stocks to Plunge,” The New York Times (March 15, 2000).

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The New Enclosure (Part III)

 

Discussions of patent policy in the United States and elsewhere often overlook the fact that the original intent of issuing patents (not to be confused with sovereign-granted commercial privileges) was to encourage the disclosure and spread of novel devices to stimulate manufacturing and trade.  The earliest patents (such as those awarded by the Republic of Venice in the 15th century) were designed for this purpose.

Patents issued to the U.S. government were comparatively few before World War II.  (Military contractors typically retained patent rights by default.)  By the height of U.S. involvement in World War II, research in federal laboratories, along with industry contracts with the military services, had contributed to a ten-fold increase in federal government patents.

Until the 1980s federal policy treated most of the intellectual property produced by research funded with public dollars as presumptive public property.  Using royalty-free licenses issued by federal research agencies, the private sector could develop and market products incorporating information contained in federally owned patents.

When Congress created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) in 1946, the national security ramifications of the AEC’s work meant that the federal government would remain the owner of inventions produced by the AEC’s private sector contractors as well as in its own government operated laboratories.  Four years later, the first uniform federal government-wide patent policy, issued by President Truman, extended the AEC’s patent policy to any invention made by a federal employee, “on government time,” or with federal dollars.

Neither then, nor now, has anyone seriously argued that the federal government is equipped to compete with the business sector, nor that it should, by itself, attempt to commercialize the innovative products that could result from federally funded research.  But as the tensions of the Cold War began to subside, fewer and fewer members of Congress questioned whether taxpayers should have to pay twice for marketable innovations based on public intellectual property.

The pro-business Republican ideology that carried Ronald Reagan into the White House in 1980 embraced the notion that taxpayers could pay for the research that produced innovations, and then pay again for those innovations when they appeared in the marketplace.  Meanwhile, corporate interests that did indeed finance the risk of product development and marketing, complained that government contributed nothing but impediments to American technological progress.  And so a moral barrier between private lucre and public good began to weaken against political pressure to “commercialize” the public’s intellectual capital.

Most economists agreed with Attorney General Nicholas Katzenbach when he told the Senate Small Business Committee in 1965 that he knew of no “data, studies, or facts of any kind at all which could possibly support” the notion that giving patent rights to federal contractors would “foster the prompt working of inventions.”[i]

Notwithstanding the conclusions of numerous economists and his own Attorney General, when President Kennedy issued patent policy guidelines to executive branch agencies, buried in the policy language was a subtle transfer of the public’s presumptive intellectual property rights to the private sector.  Kennedy’s policy directed that if two or more potential government contractors offered otherwise competitive proposals, “the willingness to grant the government principal or exclusive rights in resulting inventions will be an additional factor in the evaluation of proposals.”[ii] Thus might the public obtain what it had previously owned.  The die was cast.

A bi-partisan consensus emerged (and persists) supporting the enclosure by the private sector of publicly generated intellectual capital in the unsubstantiated belief that commercializing all scientific discoveries is in the public interest, and that patents singularly motivate the development and marketing of innovative products.  This consensus enabled the Nixon administration to allow government agencies to grant exclusive licenses to commercial developers of inventions covered by federal patents, patent applications, or government contracts (subject to a loose array of criteria likely to be met by anyone seeking such a license).  Also enjoying bi-partisan support were the 1980 “Bayh-Dole” amendments to the patent and trademark laws, which invited non-profit organizations and small businesses to “elect to retain title” to inventions made under a federal contract or grant.

The credulity of the Congress and the White House in allowing the steady enclosure—or proprietary capture—of the public’s intellectual property created through research and development funded by the federal government was rationalized in two ways.  First was the argument that the private sector was better suited to commercializing marketable innovations, an argument that could have been met through licensing rather than transfers of patent ownership.  Second was the expectation that patent ownership would ensure public disclosure and dissemination of the knowledge embedded in a newly patented invention.

However, suppose the recipient of a right to patent fails to patent the invention, instead concealing the invention as a trade secret?  Then the intellectual capital is irretrievably lost from the public ‘commons’ as well as public ownership.  Its absence is unknowable, and its loss invisible.  By the end of the 20th century, concluded the Government Accounting Office, the principal federal research agencies (DOD, NSF, NIH, NASA and the DOE) were unable to account for over two thirds of the more than 1,700 patents issued by the US Patent and Trademark Office as government-originated inventions.  Nor had NASA and DOE effectively tracked the outcomes of patent rights waived to their contractors and grantees.[iii]

Economists have been unable to isolate a singularly significant causal relationship between patent ownership and the successful commercialization of innovations.  Effective capitalization, systems integration, exploitation of tacit knowledge, and mastery of production and marketing strategies, along with the ability to pursue incremental product improvements, matter as much if not more than patent ownership.  The most promising business model may require universal adoption, rather than monopoly control, of system components—consider the open system VHS videocassette recorder, or the USB (universal serial bus) that standardized the market for all kinds of computer peripherals.

Far from promoting technological innovation, intellectual property itself can be the basis of an income stream of license fees or royalties, secure corporate debt, or deployed to “corner the market” with patent pools that capture for investors monopoly control over the critical technologies in an industry as well as known alternatives.  “Patents have recently become hot property,” noted Forbes in 2005, enabling small companies “armed with patents but little or no product” to fill their coffers with the fruits of their victories in patent infringement suits against “large business.”[iv]

Indeed, an ‘explosion’ of patenting since the early 1980‘s could be doing more harm than good.[v] Michael Heller’s The Gridlock Economy:  How Too Much Ownership Wrecks Markets, Stops Innovation, and Costs Lives (Basic Books, 2008) contributes to the growing disenchantment with the lucre-driven private sector lionized by Ayn Rand and Ronald Reagan.  The financial crisis of 2008 showed that the private sector cannot even manage its own greed.

The Congress’s decades long conversion of publicly generated intellectual capital into the private sector’s intangible assets has accomplished something only a few might have intended: the engorgement of investment portfolios with a ‘wealth’ of mysterious, if not vaporous, intellectual property.  Securities, analogous to bundled mortgages, promise revenue streams from intangible assets, e.g., royalties for the use of copyrighted materials and licenses for the use of patented technologies.[vi] Notwithstanding the enormous challenge of valuing securities that bundle patents or patent rights (a challenge that has spawned yet another new field of financial acrobatics, ‘intangible property valuation.’[vii]), intellectual property has grown as a significant component of the asset base of the S&P 500.

Successful democracies combine the most critical intangible asset any society can offer—the free flow of ideas—with the assurance that their citizens will share equitably in the material fruits of their enterprise.  The incremental proprietary capture of the public sphere that we have seen since the 1960’s threatens the free flow of ideas and citizen prosperity in perilous ways for all of us.  The failure of our policy makers—inadequately prodded by our citizens—to ensure an Open Internet may be one of the final nails in the coffin of an authentic American democracy.  (See also post for February 16, 2013, National Public Wi-Fi: Why it Matters to You.)

 


[i] Katzenbach quoted in The Washington Post, July 30, 1965.

[ii] Federal Register, 28 (200), “John F. Kennedy, Memorandum and Statement on Government Patent Policy,” (October 12, 1963), pp. 10943-46.  Federal inventions with national security significance continue to be presumptively ‘titled’ to the government, typically in the cases of the Department of Energy and NASA, which can, however, waive its patent rights.

[iii] General Accounting Office, “Technology Transfer: Reporting Requirements for Federally Sponsored Inventions Need Revisions,” GAO/RCED-99-242 (August 1999).  Sylvia Kraemer, “Federal Intellectual Property Policy and the History of Technology: The Case of NASA Patents,” History and Technology, Vol. 17 (2001).

[iv] Chad Huston, “Survey of IP Monetization Techniques,” IP Today, Vol. 11, No. 10 (October 2004); Margaret M. Blair, Steven M.H. Wallman, Unseen Wealth: Report of the Brookings Task Force on Intangibles, Brookings Institution Press, 2001; Juergen H. Daum, Intangible Assets and Value Creation (John Wiley and Sons, 2002).  Licensing income from intellectual property grew from $18 million in 1990 to an estimated $500 billion in 2005.

[v] Giovanni Dosi, Luigi Marengo, Corrado Pasquali, “How Much Should Society Fuel the Greed of Innovators: On the Relations Between Appropriability, Opportunities and Rates of Innovation,” LEM [Laboratory of Economics and Management, Sant’Anna School of Advanced Studies] Working Papers, 17 (July 2006); Michael A. Heller and Rebecca S. Eisenbery, “Can Patents Deter Innovation?  The Anti-commons in Biomedical Research,” Science, Vol.280 (May 1, 1998); Adam Jaffe and Josh Lerner, Innovation and Its Discontents (Princeton, 2004); Don E. Kash and William Kingston, “Patents in a World of Complex Technologies,”  Science and Public Policy (February 2001); David Mowery, Richard Nelson, Bhaven N. Sampat, and Arvids A. Ziedonis, “The Growth of Patenting and Licensing by U.S. Universities: An Assessment of the Effects of the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,”  Research Policy, Vol. 30 (2001); James Surowiecki, “The Open Secret of Success,”  The New Yorker (Mayb12, 2008).

[vi] Karen Richardson, “Bankers Hope for a Reprise of ‘Bowie Bonds,’” The Wall Street Journal (August 23, 2005).

[vii] Stephen Bennett, “The IP Asset Class: Protecting and Unlocking Inherent Value,” Vol. 5, The John Marshall Review of Intellectual Property Law (2006).

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Why Dieting is Hard for Uncle Sam

Whether devout or passionate, “severe” conservatives (as republican presidential candidate Mitt Romney styled himself), assert a belief that the private sector should command all economic activity, while the public sector is reduced to as close to nothing as possible.  Here is Mr. Romney on his rival Rick Santorum: “Sen. Santorum is a nice guy, but he’s never had a job in the private sector.”

The federal government has been the target of conservative politicians since before the public sector’s rapid growth after World War II. The wonder is that after six post-war republican presidents, four of whom were reelected for a second term, the campaign against government has been so unsuccessful that republican candidates today still invoke it as proof of their ideological identity and resolve.

But we should not wonder: There is no more reality behind the rhetorical campaign against the public sector than there is behind one campaign enthusiast’s warning that “the government had better keep its hands off of my Medicare.”  Were it not for the federal government, numerous companies, forced to depend on the private sector’s ‘free market,’ would become mere shadows of their former selves.

Since the 1960s federal policy–supported by both parties–has required all federal agencies to procure their necessary goods and services from the private sector.  The result has been an “iron triangle:” The flow of federal procurement dollars from (a) executive branch agencies through contracts and grants to (b) private sector firms and organizations is protected by (c) members of congress, whose bill writing chores are alleviated by corporate lobbyists–many of whom were once members of congress themselves.  To observe the iron triangle at work, spend a few evenings with the on-line Federal Procurement Data System (https://www.fpds.gov) and OpenSecrets.org, which tracks money in politics.

Nine state congressional delegations sent more than two members to join the newly formed Tea Party Caucus in 2010: California, Florida, Georgia, Kansas, Louisiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Texas.  If these states’ delegations were able to satisfy their Tea Party constituents by dramatically shrinking the federal government, what would happen?  All of them would probably come to regret it, because their constituents typically receive more dollars from the federal government than they pay to it in federal taxes.

In 2009 all of these states received at least than 20% more than they paid Uncle Sam in taxes the following year. South Carolina received the most, or169% more. Of all the Tea Party states Texas, for all its patriotism, received the smallest percentage of federal dollars in 2009 in excess of what it paid in 2010 (20%).

What was all that money spent on?  The largest amount of federal funds distributed among the states consisted of procurements and grants.  Federal contracts and grants in 2009 amounted to $1.3 trillion pumped back into the private sector.

Among the Tea Party caucus states, California’s private sector benefited from over $64 billion in contracts. Texas received slightly over half that much in federal contracts ($35 billion), while $17.5 billion went to Florida.  Missouri and Tennessee received more than $10 billion each.  The private sector in the remaining Tea Party caucus states (South Carolina, Georgia, Louisiana, and Kansas)  received between $8 billion and $2.5 billion in federal contracts each.  (Maine received $1.4 billion in 2009.)

When members of congress play by the rules laid out in the Pendleton Act (1883) and the Procurement Integrity Act (1988), they do not lobby for individual businesses.  But there is another way they can ensure that public sector dollars help support the private sector at home: Maintain or increase appropriations to those federal programs that award contracts to their constituents’ businesses.

So, vote to shrink the federal government if that makes you feel good.  But once our victorious candidates learn how and where our tax dollars get spent, their energies wander to other urgent national concerns, returning to the size of government only when the TV cameras reappear.


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